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Sequencing Regional Integration and Monetary Cooperation in Asia.  
Are there Lessons from the EU? 
                                             (Abstract paper) 
I. The  Policy  Problem 
The launch of a common currency among 12 member countries of the EU has raised much 
attention in those developing countries and emerging markets which for many years have 
been engaged in liberalising trade and factor movements among each other. Especially after 
the Asian crisis 1997, governments of these markets have started to analyse whether the entry 
into monetary cooperation by tying their exchange rates  could protect their currencies against 
speculative attacks from financial markets. Furthermore, regional or bilateral stand-by 
agreements have been discussed as a first step towards creating a regional firewall against 
such attacks. Early experiences in the EU such as an implicit signal of the German 
Bundesbank to defend the French Franc/Deutsch Mark exchange rate since the second half of 
the eighties (which could never be proven) are thought to give support for similar endeavours 
in emerging markets even it is well-known that the state of real sector integration by forming 
free trade areas or customs unions has by no means as advanced in these markets as in 
Europe. 
Therefore, the debate centres around the question whether one needs a sufficiently high level 
of real sector integration to make the entry into monetary cooperation credible and sustainable 
or whether an early entry into monetary cooperation can even give an impulse to further real 
sector integration and thus even create conditions for what is called in literature an optimum 
currency area. Technically, the question focusses on the so-called exogeneity or endogeneity 
of an optimum currency area OCA). 
II.  The Conceptual Problem of Sequencing Regional and Monetary Integration 
The ruling view on sequencing regional integration and monetary cooperation has been 
recently labeled Mundell-I by Ronald MacKinnon (2004). Mundell in his earlier works argues 
that in a situation where  
– economic structures of potential partner countries are diverse, 
– labour markets are segmented,   2
 – expectations are stationary, 
exogenous shocks hitting the countries are asymmetric as they affect one country only. 
Therefore, a flexible exchange rate is needed to adjust to such shocks. OCA conditions are not 
given and they cannot be created by an early entry into monetary cooperation through fixing 
exchange rates. In more popular terms, this view has been called also Coronation Theory in 
the sense that after deep real sector integration by liberalising trade and factor movements 
economic structures of countries would converge, shocks would become symmetric and at the 
very end the entry into monetary cooperation up to the creation of a single currency would be 
the coronation of this long-term process. 
In recent years, also stimulated by Robert Mundell, there has been the competing theory 
(Mundell–II) saying that expectations are not stationary or exchange markets would be 
forward-looking. Therefore, a common currency across countries could mitigate asymmetric 
shocks by better reserve pooling and portfolio diversification. In simple terms, a common 
currency would force trading partners to share the adjustment costs of an adverse shock. 
Under flexible exchange rates, costs of adjustment would have to be borne entirely by the 
country hit by the shock and that would have also negative implications for real sector 
integration. It could even put achievements of real sector integration reached in the past at 
risk. In popular terms, this view has also been labelled Vehicle Theory in the sense that 
monetary cooperation would be instrumental to promote real sector integration or prevent real 
sector integration from disintegration. Proponents of this view often point to the situation of 
Italy when it became evident that the country would be among the first round members of 
EMU. Interest rates on Lira-denominated bonds declined to a level of the other qualifiers and 
that “free lunch”  helped Italy to stimulate growth and to be prepared for further deepening of 
real sector integration.  
The question is whether Asian conditions reflect at least some of these European experiences. 
III.  Optimum Currency Areas: Do They Exist? Are They Needed? Can We Go Along 
Without Them? 
It is obvious that Asia defined as Southeast and Northeast Asia (thereby excluding South Asia 
and Central Asia) is far from fulfilling the conditions even if one could argue that neither the 
US nor the EU meet conditions of a complete optimum currency area; there is no doubt that 
conditions in Asia are far less fulfilled than in any of the other areas. Economic structures are 
diverse between commodity producing countries and non-commodity producing countries. 
Income levels differ highly between Singapore and the Indochinese countries. Institutions 
such as the common external trade policy of a customs union do not exist, capital markets are 
segmented and labour cannot move freely across borders of individual countries). But what 
matters more is that currency blocs, trading blocs and capital blocs do not overlap. In Asian   3
countries (except for Japan), external debt is Dollarised and not denominated in one of the 
regional currencies original sin. The countries have preferred to use different sorts of pegs to 
the Dollar. Trade is not invoiced in regional currencies. Even the Yen does not play a major 
role as an invoicing currency in Japanese trade. Trade is more intensive with the US and 
Europe than with neighbouring Asian countries though with the emergence of China in 
international trade this is now slightly changing. Capital transactions, as well as the reserve 
currencies and anchor currencies basically rely on non-regional currencies. No currency in the 
region qualifies for serving as an international currency. Even if  monetary stability would be 
given such as in the Singaporean case, the Singaporean economy is much too small to 
shoulder the burden of an international currency for its currency. The Chinese Renmenbi is 
non-convertible. Financial markets in China are restricted and decoupled from the 
international financial system and the role of the Japanese Yen suffers from weakness of the 
Japanese banking system as well as from the relatively poor growth performance of Japan 
during the nineties. An important barrier against the stronger overlapping of regional trade 
and capital transactions is the resistance of the countries to accept some sort of regional 
hegemon, to surrender national sovereignties and to give regional institutions political clout. 
Simply there is no political will to proceed along the track of regionalism as it was started in 
Europe in the second half of the fifties. 
IV.  Deepening Integration in Goods and Factor Markets: The Institutional Lacuna 
Weaknesses of an institutionalised regionalism become obvious when we look at the two 
approaches which are worth mentioning in Asia, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and 
open regionalism model of the  East Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The 
ASEAN Free Trade Area has not yet been completed and the main instrument to achieve this 
is (the so-called Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme) excludes important products 
and services and especially non-tariff barriers. A two-track approach of giving the less 
advanced Indochinese countries (Vietnam, Lao, Myanmar, and Cambodia) more time to 
participate in the system simply means that the deadline for meeting the requirements of a free 
trade area are shifted more and more towards the future. Sovereignty on all economic affairs 
is exclusively on the national side.  
APEC which includes countries of  the Western Pacific Rim is not based on a formal 
agreement but reflects the very limited possibilities of a regional coherence but hoping that 
peer-driven competition between the neighbouring countries would bring the region towards 
free trade by the year 2020 at the latest. Ways to achieve this are left to the discretion of the 
individual countries. It is very likely that such shallow integration is meaningless if it comes 
to fixing a minimum level of institutionalised regionalism which appears necessary to learn 
from the European lessons of monetary integration. The same holds for factor market 
integration as free mobility of labour and capital does not exist.   4
V.  Improving Monetary Cooperation: Options and Risks 
In recent years, in spite of their low level of institutionalised relations, Asian countries have 
tried to establish some instruments of monetary cooperation. The Chiang-Mai Initiative of 
“ASEAN plus Three” introduced bilateral explicit stand-by agreements. Yet, as these 
agreements are limited in terms of the amount of funds which are covered they are unlikely to 
impress financial markets. Implicit bail-out signals  have not yet been sent. And, given the 
low state of real sector integration and political will, promises would probably face the so-
called Groucho Marx problem: One should never become a member of a club which accepts 
you as a member, or bluntly, joining a club with bad reputation can or definitely will damage 
your reputation of a joining member.  
Yet, there are small technical steps possible, one has been propagated by John Williamson 
(1999) and others claiming that the countries could jointly peg to a common basket of 
currencies instead of only to the US-Dollar. The countries could also agree on common 
weights of currencies in their joint basket. The problem of this approach is two-fold. First, 
countries maintain very different trade relations with non-regional trading partners such as 
Europe and the US. The Philippines, for instance, are much more oriented in trade towards the 
US than Thailand, which is more oriented in trade towards Europe. Strong fluctuations 
between the Euro and the Dollar could drive a wedge into a common basket peg making 
common weights unsustainable. The second problem is that countries manipulate their 
exchange rates for different reasons. For example, Singapore has manipulated its exchange 
rate in the past often in an upward direction in order to decouple the country from 
international inflation or it  has used its exchange rate to put pressure upon the domestic 
industries towards upgrading and relocating labour-intensive manufacturing abroad. 
Commodity-producing countries like Indonesia could suffer from ‘Dutch disease’ problems 
and thus manipulate exchange rates in order to lower the burden for exports of non-
commodity sectors. Such asymmetries could also make a common basket peg very difficult to 
sustain. 
Clear proposals come from Robert Mundell (2003) to either introduce a parallel currency in 
the region supported by reserves of an “Asian Monetary Fund” to compete against the 
national currencies and to convince the Japanese government to irreversibly fix the exchange 
rate between the Yen and the US-Dollar. The latter step in fact would be the first credible 
internal anchor of further monetary integration. It is very likely that other countries would join 
this peg and also fix their national currencies to the Yen/Dollar peg. Yet, it would place an 
enormous burden of adjustment pressure on the Japanese economy as an autonomous national 
monetary policy would then be no longer possible. Given the differences in the economic 
structures in the US and the Japanese economy (the Japanese economy is more an old 
economy type based on the manufacturing sector against the US economy much more   5
resembling the new economy type based on services), especially the Japanese financial 
system (banking and insurance) would have to master the adjustment burden. Japanese trade 
would also be exposed to the volatilities of the US/Euro exchange rate. In view of the strong 
exposure of the Japanese industry on the European market, any appreciation of the US-Dollar 
against the Euro would immediately impede the competitiveness of the Japanese 
manufacturing supply in Europe. 
Above all, there is the so-called “original sin” problem of emerging markets in Asia that a 
regional bond market does not exist. Unless there is trade in bonds denominated in the 
national currencies in the region it seems very difficult to establish such a market which then 
would become also attractive for institutional investors outside the region. 
VI.  What to Learn From Europe and What Not 
Asia can learn from Europe that a minimum level of regional sovereignty is very likely to be 
necessary to make the start to monetary cooperation credible, meaningful and sustainable. 
Currently it does not seem that such regional sovereignty including the state of real sector 
regional integration has already been achieved. 
Second, with non-stationary expectations, there is today more to say in favour of the Vehicle 
Theory than two or three decades before. That would mean that the entry into some sort of 
monetary cooperation by coordinating or finding common elements of national exchange rate 
regimes should not wait until economic structures have sufficiently converged so that 
exogenous shocks have become symmetric. Even if one can argue that the very much 
advanced stage of real sector integration in Europe has led to the convergence of economic 
structures and to the symmetry of shocks, the Germany unification has shown that an 
exogenous shock, hits one country over-proportionately compared to the other countries if the 
shock comes from within the region. That means that shocks will never become completely 
symmetric nor will business cycles be completely synchronised. But this even holds true 
within a single country like the US where deep specialisation has made US states more 
diverse in economic structures than in the past. Finally, Asia should learn from Europe that 
regionalism can only be successful in terms of avoiding the setbacks and the inefficiencies of 
trade diversion if regional integration is accompanied and even preceded by multilateral 
liberalisation. Only multilateral liberalisation helps countries to become competitive 
internationally so that they can also expose their sectors to regional competition especially to 
regional competition with China within Asia. 
 
VII. The Likely Scenario: Asia Will Follow US Bilateralism Not European Regionalism   6
The likely scenario is that Asian countries will not follow European regionalism, neither in 
trade nor in integration but that the so-called hub-and-spoke systems of bilateral treaties will 
be a copy of US bilateralism. Probably, in the future we will see more bilateral stand-by 
agreements as we will see more bilateral free trade agreements. Whether this will also lead to 
some sort of regionalism in trade and monetary agreements between the spokes is still open. It 
strongly depends on the future development of the Chinese economy and on the 
restrengthening of the Japanese economy. Above all, the political will to share the burden of 
exogenous shocks is absolutely vital. 
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